Using a laboratory experiment, we study how retirement plan members choose investment options using five information items prescribed by regulators. We found that asset allocation information for pre-mixed investment options -normally presented as a pie chart or a table -had the largest impact on choices. Participants preferred investment options with more, and more evenly weighted, asset class allocations. This novel application of a 1/n strategy differs significantly from the existing findings of naïve diversification in 'mix-ityourself' conditions where participants spread resources evenly across funds or categories. When asset allocation information was included, coefficients on return and risk information had unexpected signs, but when asset allocation was omitted, participants preferred options with high Sharpe ratios. We also demonstrate that none of the five prescribed information items was significant in explaining individual choices of more than 35% of participants. These findings highlight that information contained in prescribed investment disclosures might not be used in the manner intended by the regulator. The results raise important methodological questions about the way 'user-friendly' information prescribed by regulators is validated before being legislated.
Introduction
Many retirement plans offer members menus of investment options for their savings. Standard models of investment choice assume that individuals will allocate their wealth efficiently by using relevant information on expected return, risk and covariation, while ignoring unimportant information and variations in framing. By contrast, simply observing these decisions shows that allocations are not neutral to choice architecture (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) . In particular, when confronted with large, complex, non-comparable information sets, investment choices can degenerate to ad-hoc diversification strategies (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Huberman and Jiang, 2006; Brown et al., 2007; Morrin et al., 2012; Agnew et al., 2011) or reliance on defaults (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Carroll et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2009; Beshears et al., 2008 Beshears et al., , 2013 .
Concerned about the impact of financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2007) and possible manipulation (Pool et al., 2015) in a setting of increasingly complex financial products, regulators have begun to specify the content and presentation of many types of financial disclosures, including retirement saving investment menus (Kozup et al., 2008; Beshears et al., 2011; Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011) . Here we focus on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission's (ASIC) introduction of a standard format for retirement plan investment disclosures (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) . The Australian regulator has specified both length and content, replacing long, complicated and non-standardized prospectuses. Investment disclosures must include an option label and a textual description of the strategy, as well as a real-returns target, a strategic asset allocation and a risk description. By stipulating these details, regulators aimed to help plan members locate and understand all necessary information for selecting a retirement savings investment (Treasury, 2010) .
Recent studies suggest that "improvements" to disclosures or even direct guidance does not necessarily lead to improved choices (Beshears et al., 2011; Hung et al., 2010; Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2014) . Just as expanding a choice set does not necessarily make consumers better off (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown et al., 2007; Scheibehenne et al., 2010) , simplified or "improved" disclosures may have unintended consequences. This raises critical questions about how retirement plan members use the prescribed disclosure format, whether the specific information items assist their decision process, and whether the outcomes of these decisions align with the regulator's intentions. Since many of the presentation formats we tested in our experiment are common to financial prospectuses, our results have implications for financial product disclosure regulations internationally, and for the framing and marketing of many investment products.
Specifically, we conducted four incentivized laboratory treatments to better understand university retirement plan members' and students' choice of investment options when using the prescribed investment disclosure. Notably, there was no standard format for retirement plan investment disclosures before 2012, so documents came in various forms and often ran to several hundred pages. As a result, we cannot directly compare responses of plan members to the new format with responses to an older benchmark, but we can study the relative impact of the prescribed items and formats in the new document.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we measure the marginal impact of each item in the simplified disclosure format on investment option preferences, comparing it with the sign and size predicted by standard finance theory. This allows us to identify the items in the shorter disclosure format that play a greater or lesser role in choices, and whether these effects are as expected. Second, we estimate these impacts for both the whole sample of experimental subjects and for each individual, giving a detailed view of the cross-section of responses. Third, since we found in our initial two treatments that subjects are sensitive to asset-allocation information at the expense of risk and return information, we conducted two further treatments, one where we changed the way asset allocation information is displayed and another where the allocation information is removed altogether. Fourth, the finding that information contained in prescribed investment disclosures may not be used in the manner intended by the regulator, poses, in our view, important methodological questions about the way supposedly user-friendly information prescribed by regulators is validated before implementation.
Results show that investment decisions are not immune to choice architecture. This is perhaps not surprising since even well-informed investors can be influenced by unimportant information. For example, Choi et al. (2010) found that experimental subjects from a pool of Harvard and Wharton MBA students put high weight on irrelevant historical returns and failed to minimize fees when making an allocation across index mutual funds. Here we go further by demonstrating that many individuals overlook important information or find it difficult to combine several information items. In particular, we find that expected return information and simplified risk information appear to be dominated by asset allocation information for the majority of subjects. This occurs despite the substantial attention paid to the development of an appropriate summary risk measure by industry and the regulators (APRA, 2010; FSC and ASFA, 2011; ASIC, 2012a,b) . However, when that (prescribed) asset-allocation information is omitted, subjects tend to revert to conventional risk-return trade-offs, choosing options with higher Sharpe ratios. 1 In their survey of heuristics and biases in retirement savings, Benartzi and Thaler (2007, p. 90 ) mention that "[t]he diversification heuristic does not seem to apply when people pick among premixed funds, as the naïve investor perceives all the funds to be equally diversified." By contrast, we find that the most predictive disclosure feature for people's decisions is the asset allocation information for each investment option. Specifically, when they are given information about the strategic asset allocations of options, participants' choices appear to be predominantly driven by a preference for pre-mixed options which are low in concentration and close-to-evenly spread between asset classes, having a number of approximately equally sized segments of "pie". This result holds whether the allocation information is shown as a pie chart or a table and suggests that the tendency to adopt naïve (1/n) diversification strategies is highly prevalent. It also extends beyond situations of "mixit-yourself" portfolios (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 2001 ) to our novel setting in which all choices are made from pre-mixed investment options. 2 Most subjects apparently use a naïve diversification strategy in preference to making a risk-return trade-off until the allocation information is omitted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch out the policy and institutional background that motivated our study. In Section 3 we detail the experimental design and implementation. In Section 4 we report the results of the four treatments in our experiment and in Section 5 we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of our results.
Policy and institutional background
Concerns about consumer protection have led to initiatives that stipulate financial product disclosures in an attempt to make financial decisions easier. For example, at its October 2011 meeting, the G20 endorsed a set of common principles on consumer protection in the field of financial services, developed by a number of international organizations including the OECD and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (OECD, 2011) . Motivated by the concern that different financial products are not easily compared, Principle 4 (Disclosure and Transparency) recommends that financial services providers supply consumers with information on fundamental benefits, risks and terms of products. Similarly, in 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new simplified (or enhanced) disclosure document for mutual funds. Mutual funds now have the option of sending investors a two to four page "Summary Prospectus", instead of the long and detailed statutory prospectus. The Summary Prospectus contains the mutual fund's investment objectives, strategies, risks, costs, and performance (SEC, 2007) .
Regulators first framed Australia's financial product disclosures in the 1990s on the underlying principle that "consumers are assumed for the most part, to be the best judges of their own interests" (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p. 191) and that "disclosure rules would aid and improve the quality of decision making" (Gruen and Wong, 2010, p. 34) . 3 Possibly because of, first, this high-level regulatory approach, second, a lack of guidance, and third, a focus by product providers on compliance and disclosure obligations (Treasury, 2010) , financial product disclosure statements (PDSs) were long, detailed, complicated and hard to compare. Cooper (2010) argues that these features exacerbated member disengagement with the retirement savings system. Australia's second attempt at financial product disclosure -known as the shorter PDS regime -began in June 2012 and took a different approach (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). 4 The new regulations were very prescriptive and specified both the length (maximum of eight A4 pages or equivalent) and structure (nine section headings for retirement saving products), as well as the content. 5 The stipulated information for investment options is:
(a) The name of the option, a short description and the type of investor for whom it is suitable; (b) A list of the asset classes in which the option invests and an indication of the strategic asset allocation of the portfolio; (c) The investment return objective of the option; (d) The minimum suggested time frame for holding the investment (i.e., a length of time over which the return objective is likely to be realized); and (e) A summary risk level for the option.
The short-form PDS issued by the university retirement plan that we study (UniSuper) follows these requirements very closely (UniSuper, 2015a) . Examples of the information disclosed for three illustrative investment options are shown in Fig. 1 (which is based on the 2012 version of UniSuper, 2015a; the layout of the 2015 version is the same although the colours have changed).
The example in Fig. 1 labelled "Balanced", is described as being "invested in a diversified portfolio, comprising mainly growth assets, such as Australian and international shares, property and alternative investments, and with some bonds", and is considered suitable for "investors with a high risk tolerance, seeking a high level of expected returns" (subsection (a) above). Subsection (b) prescribes "a list of the asset classes in which the option invests and an indication of the strategic asset allocation of the asset classes". The approach taken by UniSuper has been to show these as a pie chart with extra text about the strategic asset allocation and the ranges. For example, the strategic allocation for Australian shares in the "Balanced" option ( Fig. 1 ) is shown as a segment of the pie chart and labelled as 36% of the total investment, with a range of 23.5-48.5%. While this approach is not mandatory, many other Australian retirement savings plans use the same format. Subsection (c) prescribes a description of the "investment return objective of the option", while subsection (d) prescribes a statement of the "minimum suggested time frame for holding the investment". For instance, the "Balanced" option's objective is "to achieve returns (after fund taxes and investment fees) that are at least 3.0% p.a. more than inflation (CPI)", with a suggested period of holding the investment of "six years".
Subsection (e) prescribes a description of the risk level of the option. The risk description is not defined in the legislation, but after consultation with industry, the regulator issued specific guidance that plans should explain investment risk as the "expected frequency of negative annual return" (in this case four in twenty years) along with a summary risk level which is reported as "high" for the "Balanced" option (APRA, 2010; FSC and ASFA 2011; ASIC, 2012a,b) . 6
Experimental design and implementation

Design
We designed Treatments 1-4 to study how our participants (university staff members and students) use the investment information prescribed by the regulator. Each treatment had three phases: first, an option review phase, second, a choice phase, and third, a survey phase in which we administered the Holt-Laury instrument (Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2005) and an additional, widely used domain-specific risk tolerance instrument (DOSPERT; Weber and Johnson, 2008; Szrek et al., 2012; Deck et al., 2013) . At the end of each treatment, we also collected demographic information. 7 6 The actual short-form product disclosure statement provides the summary investment information for a representative investment option only. Plan members are then referred to a separate document which includes single page summary information for all investment options on the menu (UniSuper, 2015b) . 7 The complete set of instructions, with screenshots, is available in Online Appendix B and from the corresponding author.
Financial features of investment options
At the time we conducted the experiment, UniSuper offered 15 (six pre-mixed and nine single sector) investment options 8 to members with defined contribution (accumulation) plans. Virtually all members of this sector-wide plan have at least one defined contribution account. They can also choose any blend of options from the menu. We selected 10 of 15 investment options for participants to compare and rank in all treatments: the six pre-mixed options with varying exposures to cash, fixed interest, domestic and international equities, property and alternative investments (e.g., private equity, hedge funds and infrastructure), and four representative single-sector options including investments entirely in cash, domestic sovereign bonds, domestic equities, and international equities (labelled "Global Environmental Opportunities"). We reduced the number of single-sector options to lower the chance that subjects would become fatigued, keeping the set of four that had the most diverse features. Table 1 summarizes the features of the ten selected investment options.
Each investment option is characterized by certain risk and return objectives. These return and risk objectives shown in the short-form PDS are not calculated from the historical performance of the strategy, but are a projection made by the plan provider based on the strategic asset allocation of the investment option. They are intended to be a guide to expected returns (for members) and a goal (for the investment managers). In the experiment, subjects see the PDS information, but for the purposes of estimation and to help with interpreting the results, we infer the risk and return values in Table 1 from the risk and return objectives supplied in the PDS, by assuming log-normally distributed returns. The implicit growth assets risk-premium we infer from the objectives shown in the PDS is a modest 3.5% p.a. and the maximum annualized volatility of any of the ten options is around 15% p.a.
A common approach to comparing investment portfolios is to rank them by the Sharpe ratio, which measures riskadjusted returns. We calculate the Sharpe ratio by assuming that returns to each investment option (apart from cash) are i.i.d. lognormally distributed. The Sharpe ratio is then (r p − r f )/ p , where the return to cash is the risk-free rate, r f , r p , (median return) is the return objective for the investment option with inflation added back, and the standard deviation, p , is inferred by combining the return objective with the quantile information implied by the investment option's risk measure (number of years in 20 of negative returns). We assume that the CPI takes the historically average value of 2.5% p.a. Here, the pre-mixed options have higher (expected) Sharpe ratios than the single sector options, and a participant who maximized Sharpe ratios would prefer the "High growth" option.
In some situations, however, maximizing the Sharpe ratio is not an optimal strategy and more information about the construction of the portfolio is needed. One essential information item for combining sector options efficiently, namely the covariance or correlation matrix between asset classes, is not shown to plan members in the PDS or supporting documents. Without covariance information, investors need to use whatever information is provided to assess how well diversified an option might be.
We use three indicators to capture the asset allocation (diversification) information (see Table 1 ). The first is the percentage of the portfolio allocated to growth assets; this measures the proportion of growth assets to defensive assets in each chart. (In the UniSuper 2012 product disclosure document these proportions are coloured maroon for growth and blue for defensive assets and can be read off the page.) The second indicator we calculate is the Herfindahl Index of portfolio concentration,
where w i is the proportional allocation to asset class i, and n is the number of asset classes included in the option. For single sector options, HI = 1. For any given n, HI is minimized where w i = 1/n, ∀i. In other words, the Herfindahl Index decreases as more, and more equally sized, sectors appear in the pie chart. The "Balanced" option has the lowest HI. While participants cannot read the HI of the different options directly off the page, the third row of the investment option information tells them the number of asset classes and their percentage weight.
As an alternative to the Herfindahl Index, we also compute how close each multi-asset class option is to an equally weighted allocation. For this purpose, we use the normalized sum of squared deviations from 1/n for any multi-asset class option, 9 8 Introductory documentation states that pre-mixed options are "designed for investors who are seeking diversified investment options . . . managed on their behalf" whereas the sector options "are designed for investors who wish to create their own blend of assets" (pp. 7 and 13 of the 2012 version of UniSuper, 2015b; in the current version a similar text can be found on page 5). 9 We normalize by n/(n − 1) to ensure that Dev<1 for cases of multi-asset options with very unequal weights. For example, in the case of an option where w1 = 1 and all others are 0, Table shows investment option characteristics. The return objective is 'to achieve returns (after fund taxes and investment fees) that are at least X% p.a. more than inflation (CPI).' Risk is described as the expected frequency of negative annual return expressed as 'X in twenty'. The summary risk level is a textual descriptor prescribed by the regulator matched to a scale of negative returns frequencies. The Herfindahl Index summarizes the concentration of the portfolio by summing and squaring the weight of each asset class. Deviation from 1/n measures sum of squared deviations of asset class weights from 1/n, normalized by n/(n − 1), where n is the number of asset classes depicted in the pie chart for the investment option. Sector options are set to one. The timeframe is the minimum suggested timeframe for the investment. Growth assets measures the percentage of the portfolio allocated to equities, property and alternative investments. The Sharpe ratio assumes that the log gross return to each investment option (apart from cash) is i.i.d. normally distributed, with the implied standard deviation, p , is based on the return objective, rp, as the median return, and the quantile information in the estimated number of negative returns. The Sharpe ratio is then (rp − r f )/ p where the return to cash is the risk-free rate, r f . We assume CPI = 2.5% p.a. where Dev decreases towards zero as the sectors in the pie chart approach equal sizes (rather than as more are added). We assign Dev = 1 to all portfolios with one asset class. The "Socially responsible balanced" option has three asset classes: "Cash and fixed interest" (30%), "International shares" (24.5%) and "Australian shares" (45.5%), and the lowest deviation from 1/n even though it is only the fourth least concentrated option according to the Herfindahl Index.
Choice structure and procedure
In all four treatments, participants were asked to express their preference ("rankings") over all 45 pairwise comparisons that the ten investment options allowed. Table 2 summarizes this common component and the within-treatment and between-treatment differences. 10 To study the influence of the option name, in Treatment 1 we ran -in a counterbalanced design -subjects twice through these 45 comparisons, revealing the option name (e.g., "Socially responsible balanced") in one condition ("Name") and omitting it in the other condition ("No-name"). To check whether our specific elicitation procedure mattered, in Treatment 2 we ran subjects through all 45 Name comparisons and then added two extra tasks to the Named ranking. We did not repeat the No-name rankings exercise because the absence of option names had little impact on preferences in Treatment 1.
The two additional choice tasks in Treatment 2 were "best-worst" elicitation procedures. In the first "best-worst" procedure we ran 14 trials in which four options were presented in a grid arrangement. Participants first indicated their best option from this set (by clicking on its name), then the worst, then the best of the remaining two. The investment options in each 4-option set were selected to match a balanced incomplete block design ("BIBD") that allowed calculation of an aggregate relative ranking. In the second choice task participants, using drop-down menus, were asked for the most and least-favoured of all 10 options, then of the remaining 8 options, then of the remaining 6, 4, and 2. This provided an explicit ranking ("Complete") of the options for each participant. Consistent with the previous tasks, information about any of the 10 options could be reviewed at any time via the on-screen menu.
Analysis of the first two treatments showed that participants put considerable weight on asset allocation information. We therefore looked further into this effect, first by testing whether the pie-chart format itself was influencing decisions (Treatment 3) and then by removing the allocation weights altogether (Treatment 4). Specifically, in Treatment 3 we showed half of the participants the asset allocation information from the third panel in the information set (see Fig. 1 ) in a table (" Table" condition) instead of the pie chart ("Pie chart" condition). In Treatment 4 we completely removed the pie chart and the table. Hence, the third panel was blank for all participants, and for half of them we also blanked out the first panel of the information set that gave a textual description of the asset-class composition ("No-description" and "Description" conditions, respectively; see Table 2 ). This group saw only investment return objectives, minimum recommended time frame, expected frequency of negative returns and the summary risk measure. In all other important respects, Treatments 3 and 4 were the same as Treatment 2.
Finally, participants in Treatments 2-4 were also given the choice of either accepting a bonus amount paid on the basis of their preferred option's performance, 11 or receiving a payment from the plan's (superannuation fund's) default investment option. 12 10 In addition to the components described in Table 2 , participants in Treatments 3 and 4 were given an allocation task following the paired comparison elicitation. The allocation task invited participants to indicate their preferred percentage allocation of their investment across all ten available funds. In line with previous research (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) , we found a modal preference for a 1/n distribution whereby participants made an allocation to all ten options, typically allocating around 10% of their investment to each fund, with some evidence of bimodality in some conditions (e.g., the No-Description condition of T4) with the second modal cluster of an allocation to 2 or 3 funds. Because these data are of a different nature to the paired-choices and do not speak to our main question concerning the features of the short-form PDS driving preference we do not consider them further. 11 In Treatments 3 and 4 the participants' preferred option had an equal probability (0.5) of being the option most preferred in the pairwise choice or a portfolio comprising the percentage allocation preference of their investment across the ten funds -see Footnote 9.
12 As a preliminary exploration of the interaction between information, engagement and defaults, we offered participants in Treatment 2-4 the opportunity to receive their payout via a draw from their most preferred investment option or from the default option, without identifying it. Only 2 of 36 participants
To account for opportunity-cost differences, students were paid roughly half 13 of the amount paid to staff. Staff subjects (student subjects) received a base payment of 18 (9) Australian dollars for their time and an additional payoff based on a random draw from the returns distribution of their most preferred option and the Holt-Laury risk attitude elicitation measure. The expected value of that additional payoff was larger than the base payment -it was based on the performance of a $20 ($10) investment for staff subjects (student subjects) -and this was known to all subjects.
Implementation
We conducted all treatments in the UNSW Australia Business School Lab. The sessions for Treatments 1 and 2 (3, 4) were conducted in September 2012 (May 2013, August 2014, respectively). We recruited student subjects from the student pool through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), a standard procedure for incentivized experiments at the UNSW Australia Business School. We also created a pool of university retirement plan members (staff subjects) through invitations posted on the UNSW staff homepage (myUNSW) and in the fortnightly online newsletter for UNSW staff (news@UNSW), and sent by email from the UniSuper CEO to UNSW members of UniSuper. From this pool, participants were recruited via ORSEE. Given the nature of the subject pool, we cannot be sure to what extent the employees that signed up are a representative sample. Based on the demographic information that we have, we likely over-sampled younger and better educated university retirement plan members.
For Treatment 1 (2), we recruited a total of 34 (1) student subjects and a total of 26 (35) staff subjects. For additional Treatments 3 and 4 we had a smaller staff pool to draw on. Since in the initial two treatments we had not found any significant difference between staff and student responses, we recruited 62 (58) student subjects and 14 (0) staff subjects. In all treatments, student subjects had to provide evidence that they had a retirement plan account. Student subjects and staff subjects were recruited for different sessions. Average total earnings were about $21 for students and $41 for staff, with the minimum earnings being $19 for students $36 for staff and the maximum earnings being $23 for students and $50 for staff. For most participants the experimental sessions took less than an hour although in a few cases it took up to 90 min. Subjects were free to leave once they had finished all tasks and were paid on their way out behind a screen.
Results
Counts and rankings
The most preferred option from the pairwise comparison tasks when participants saw the allocation information as a pie chart (Treatments 1, 2 and the "Pie chart" condition of Treatment 3), was the "Conservative balanced" option (Table 3) . "Conservative balanced" was also a close second to the "Capital stable" option in Treatment 3 when participants saw the asset allocations in a table (rather than the pie chart). Sectoral options were less popular overall than pre-mixed options, with the "Cash" sectoral option often rated the lowest. Finally, the option most sensitive to the removal of labels (in the No-name condition) was "Global environmental opportunities", which is invested entirely in international shares. In the No-name condition this was the least preferred option, but when labels and descriptions were included, it was ranked at seventh place, indicating that the extra information influenced decisions significantly. 14 One reason why this option may be more popular when labelled is that people may favour companies or products that broadcast their environmental credentials, or because they may want to be perceived by the experimenters as environmentally conscious.
In removing the asset-allocation information (Treatment 4), on the other hand, we find that the most sensitive option to this change is the "High growth" option. The "High growth" option has the highest Sharpe ratio, and while it was relatively unpopular in Treatments 1-3, it ranked the highest in both conditions in Treatment 4. Indeed, when the participants had only a name, risk, return, and time frame information to guide their choices, "High growth" was most preferred in 78% of the pairs in which it was offered, compared with fewer than 60% in all other treatments. This switch of rankings is preliminary evidence that the risk-return trade-off is obscured by diversification information.
As mentioned, Treatment 2 included two additional rankings tasks, one using a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) where subjects made 14 best-worst comparisons from blocks of four investment options and the other using an explicit ranking over the 10 options. The most preferred option in both of these tasks was "Socially responsible balanced" (again possibly an experimenter effect), while the least preferred was again "Cash". Fig. 2 shows the relative rankings from both these treatment tasks by graphing the count of best rankings minus worst rankings for the 36 subjects, confirming the popularity of the low concentration pre-mixed options we observed in the pairwise comparisons.
in Treatment 2, 5 of 76 in Treatment 3, and 8 of 58 in Treatment 4 elected the default option payout. The low rate of default in this case suggests that participants were reasonably sure about the decisions they had made, having spent time and effort in understanding and comparing the range of options across several dimensions. 13 For participants from the student pool, we were constrained by the payoff guidelines of the UNSW Australia Business School Lab. This is a common-pool resource used by experimenters from several disciplines under a unified governance structure (including the prohibition of deception experiments). 14 The description states: "Invests in a diversified portfolio of International companies whose business activities seek to address current and emerging environmental issues and opportunities and make a profit from these activities." Columns 2-4 in the top panel and all columns in the bottom panel show percentages of pairwise choices where the investment option in column 1 was preferred over an alternative. In the top panel, column 5 shows the number of times the option was ranked first less the number of times it was ranked fourth in the ranking exercise where four options are offered over 14 choices based on a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD). Column 6 shows number of times the investment option was chosen as best (ranked first of 10 options) less the number of times it was chosen as worst (ranked tenth) in the explicit ranking exercise. Highest ranked options are in bold font and lowest in italics.
In summary, simple counts show that, apart from the "No description" condition in Treatment 4, where subjects had no asset-allocation information whatsoever, all pre-mixed (multi-asset class) options are preferred to all sector (single-asset class) options. This pattern demonstrates that subjects focused on options diversified across asset classes, and confirms results from administrative data (Gerrans and Yap, 2013) . Introducing options' labels and descriptions in the Name conditions did little to trigger variation in choices, apart from the greater popularity of "Global environmental opportunities". When asset-allocation information is shown, rankings among pre-mixed options do not align with rankings by Sharpe ratio, but when this information is taken away, the option with the highest Sharpe ratio was most preferred.
Pooled models
We now turn to the impact on subjects' choices of the different information items prescribed in the short-form PDS. Specifically, we are interested in how subjects use the elements of the simplified PDS (i.e., the expected return, risk, time frame, textual risk label, and pie chart information) to evaluate investment options. In Treatment 1, {k 1 } 60 1 subjects made two sets of {j} 1 choices in a condition with no textual description or asset-allocation information. We define a binary variable choice k,j = 1 when x j is preferred to y j by individual k.
Pooling observations across subjects and treatments, we estimate logit models of these choices where explanatory variables include: (i) differences between the values of the information variables for option x j and option x j , and a complete set of interactions of these differences; (ii) indicator variables for the four textual risk labels, Name versus No-name condition, Pie chart versus Table condition, Staff-student status and Description versus No-description condition; and (iii) interactions between the condition indicators and the differences in information variables. The estimated logit model was:
where return j is the return objective for option x j less the return objective for option y j , risk j is the inferred annualized standard deviation of returns for option x j less the standard deviation for option y j , growth j is the proportion of growth assets in the allocation for option x j less the proportion of growth assets for option y j , diversification j is either HI j (the Herfindahl Index for option x j less the Herfindahl Index for option y j ) or Dev j (the deviation from 1/n index for option x j less the deviation from 1/n index for option y j ) and TF j is the minimum recommended time frame for investment in option x j less the recommended timeframe for option y j in years. D ij are four indicator variables taking the value 1 when x j has a textual risk label of "very low", "medium", "high" or "very high" plus four additional indicators for whether the participant was a staff member or a student and for conditions in Treatments 1, 3, and 4. We include the main effect of the treatment indicators to capture any bias towards choosing either the left or right side option caused by the treatment itself. For example, adding more, or more complicated information, such as the "Name" treatment, might increase the difficulty of the choice and cause subjects to use a short cut, such as choosing only the left or right option. We include all two-way interactions between the differences in information variables (hereafter "information variables"), and also between the information variables and the condition and student subject indicators, to allow for a more general functional form, but we report marginal effects. We also test restrictions on the return and risk variables and their interactions, including substituting the Sharpe ratio for the returns and risk variables. (Full estimation results are reported in Online Appendix A, Table A1 .) We find that together, the mandatory information items in the disclosure document, expected return, risk, asset class diversification and time frame go a long way towards explaining the pooled choices of our experimental subjects. Results reported in Table 4 show that marginal effects of these information items (or their proxies) are significantly different from zero at the 5% level in some or all of the models. (The top panel shows results when diversification is proxied by Dev and the bottom panel when the HI is included.) Of the textual risk labels, marginal effects for the "very low", "medium" and "high" labels are significant in some models. None of the condition or staff indicators had significant marginal effects. The overall marginal effect of the indicator for "Pie chart" was insignificant, indicating that whether subjects viewed allocation information in a pie chart or a table did not significantly affect choices on average. However the coefficient on the interaction between "Pie chart" and Dev or HI are significant and negative in all but one of the models. (See Table A1 in Online Appendix A.) The significant negative interaction suggests that subjects who saw the pie chart were somewhat more strongly influenced by the diversification information than those who saw the table.
More surprising are the signs of some estimated marginal effects. Contrary to theory, the effect of the difference in expected return is negative (in models 1 and 3) while the effect of the difference in standard deviations in model 3 is positive. In the models using Dev (panel 1) these effects are all significant. Even when we omit either risk or return (models 1 and 2), we still obtain these unexpected signs. When we constrain risk and return to have opposite signs by including only the difference in Sharpe ratios (model 4), estimated coefficients have the expected positive sign, but the marginal effect of the Sharpe ratio is insignificant. We come back to this puzzling result below.
By contrast, the marginal effects of the asset allocation measures demonstrate the strong influence of this information on choices. The degree of portfolio concentration and the extent to which allocations deviate from 1/n have significant effects. For example, for model 3, as HI declines by 0.1, the probability of choosing x j increases by 0.057. Similarly, as Dev j declines by 0.1, the probability of choosing x j increases by 0.055. In visual terms, this implies that the number of segments Table shows estimated marginal effects from logit estimation of choice k,j = 1 when x j is preferred to y j by individual k, return j is the return objective for option x j less the return objective for option y j , risk j is the inferred standard deviation of returns for option x j less the standard deviation for option y j , Sharpe ratio is the inferred ratio of return less the risk free rate to the standard deviation for option x j less the Sharpe ratio for option y j , growth j is the proportion of growth assets in the allocation for option x j less the proportion of growth assets for option y j , HI j is the Herfindahl index for option y j less the Herfindahl index for option y j , Dev j is the deviation from 1/n index for option x j less the deviation from 1/n index for option y j , and TF j is the minimum recommended time frame for investment in option x j less the recommended timeframe for option y j in years, very low, medium, high and very high are indicators taking the value of one when x j has that risk level, Staff-student is an indicator taking the value of one for student subjects, Name-no name is an indicator taking the value of one when the subject viewed the option name, and Pie-chart is an indicator taking the value of one when subjects viewed allocations in a pie chart display. Models include all two-way interactions between the information variables, and also between the information variables and the indicators for the Pie-chart and No-name treatments. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.5. *** p < 0.01.
and the relative size of the segments influence investment preferences. Respondents prefer more asset classes and more equally-sized percentage weights, and this effect is robust to changing the presentation from a pie chart to a table (Treatment 3). When asset-allocation weights are removed in Treatment 4, this situation is, however, reversed. In the unrestricted model 3 and the Sharpe ratio model 4, risk and return information serve their expected purposes. Table 5 reports estimates of models analogous to those in Table 4 , but using choices from participants who did not see the pie chart or table of portfolio weights in the information set. (Online Appendix A, Table A2 reports full estimation results.) The marginal effects of the returns differentials appear significant and positive, while, except for model 2 where returns are omitted, the marginal effects of risk are significant and negative. The investment time horizon also has significant explanatory power. To check whether earlier results that showed the influence of the diversification indexes were just an artefact of the limited variation in the characteristics of the investment options, we also included the diversification indicators in these estimations. The fact that the risk and return estimates are significant and have the expected signs, and when both risk and return are included in the models (3 and 4) the diversification indices are insignificant, suggests that participants in Treatments 1-3 were overlooking risk and return information, making choices primarily guided by 1/n or low concentration strategies.
We conclude that the puzzling signs on risk and return coefficients in Table 4 are most likely a side-effect of the combination of limited variation in the investment option characteristics in the experiment and participants choosing low Table shows estimated marginal effect from logit estimation of choice k,j = 1 when x j is preferred to y j by individual k, return j is the return objective for option x j less the return objective for option y j , risk j is the inferred standard deviation of returns for option x j less the standard deviation for option y j , growth j is the proportion of growth assets in the allocation for option x j less the proportion of growth assets for option y j , HI j is the Herfindahl index for option x j less the Herfindahl index for option y j , Dev j is the deviation from 1/n index for option x j less the deviation from 1/n index for option y j , and TF j is the minimum recommended time frame for investment in option x j less the recommended timeframe for option y j in years, very low, medium, high and very high are indicators taking the value of one when x j has that risk level, Description is an indicator taking the value of one when subjects were shown a textual description of the investment option. Models include all two−way interactions between the information variables, and also between the information variables and the description treatment indicator. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.5. *** p < 0.01. concentration, 1/n options. Participants appear to be using one main strategy (probably a diversification heuristic) for decisions in Treatments 1-3 and a different strategy (risk-return trade-off) in Treatment 4.
Individual models
The aggregate model reveals the crucial role of the asset-allocation information on average choices. However, estimating separate linear probability models for each individual can show how these aggregate tendencies vary across subjects. To this end, we estimated linear probability models for each subject that are similar to the pooled logit models but leaving out any indicators that stay constant for the individual.
Our results show that subjects use elements of the information set differently. To illustrate these differences, we use each subject's estimates to compute the marginal effect of return, risk, growth asset percentage, deviation from 1/n, and timeframe. Results are reported in Table 6 for models where Dev was used as the diversification proxy. Results for HI were very similar. The top panel shows the patterns of significant marginal effects for individuals in Treatments 1-3 (who were given asset allocation information) and the bottom panel shows results for individuals who made choices in Treatment 4 (without allocation information).
The number of significant marginal effects varies widely across individuals. Of the 172 subjects who saw asset allocation information (Treatments 1-3), 35% made choices for which none of the five information elements were significant, and another 29% made choices for which only one of the five elements was significant. On the other hand, around 5% of subjects made choices for which four or five information elements were significant. The most commonly significant variable is expected return (but often with a negative sign), followed by Dev, with predictive power in 43% and 31% of individual equations, respectively. When we remove the asset allocation information (Treatment 4), the proportion of individual equations with no significant marginal effects rises to 43%. Significant marginal effects are strongly concentrated in return and risk Table shows counts of significant (p < 0.1) marginal effects from OLS estimation of individual linear probability equations of choices. The top panel reports results for estimates from Treatments 1-3 and Panel 2 reports results for estimates from Treatment 4 where asset allocation information was not shown to subjects. Columns 2-6 show the conditional frequency of significant marginal effects for each information variable. For example, looking along row four, 25 subjects out of a total of 172 had 3 significant marginal effects in their individual equations. Of these, return was significant in 17 equations, risk in 19 equations and deviation from 1/n in 18 equations. The final column shows the total number of subjects at each significance count. The bottom row in each panel shows the total number of times the marginal effect was significant across all subjects' estimated equations.
information (45% and 26%), with growth percentage, Dev and the investment horizon each contributing less than 14% of the significant effects. For individuals in Treatments 1-3, the unexpected signs on marginal effects for risk and return are not universal, but they are considerably more frequent than the expected signs. Our individual level results confirm that most individuals preferred low-concentration investment options that deviate little from equal allocations between asset classes (i.e., those having asset allocations with more segments and of roughly equal sizes). Other information, particularly expected return targets and numerical risk measures, often have marginal effects with unexpected signs. However, these results are reversed at the individual level when asset allocation information is not available to participants, as they tend to choose investments with higher returns and lower risk. A large minority of individuals in all treatments make choices for which the information items themselves have little explanatory power.
These findings point towards the existence of groups of plan members who tend to under-use information, or who are influenced too much by manipulable elements of the disclosure at the expense of other important information. These are the groups that regulators may be interested in identifying. Some examples are plan members with low financial literacy, who would be less willing to read disclosures and less able to respond well to information (Treasury, 2010) . Our attempts to identify demographic characteristics, or risk attitudes, that explain information use by individuals resulted in uninformative or unstable results. 15
Discussion and conclusion
We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment with four treatments to understand whether, and how, university students and staff participants choose retirement savings investment options using a new short-form PDS prescribed by the regulator. The prescribed information includes expected return, risk, percentage allocations between growth and defensive assets, time frame, textual risk label and strategic asset allocation (which for the retirement plan studied here, is presented as a pie chart indicating percentage of portfolio by asset class). We summarize results as follows: 15 We estimated logit regressions of indicator variables for significant marginal effects for individuals on demographics and risk measures. We also regressed point estimates of marginal effects on demographics and risk measures. A larger sample may be needed to find more robust relationships between subject characteristics and information use. That said, our sample size per experiment is not out of line with those for standard experiments (List et al., 2011) and even if we were to find more robust relationships between subject characteristics and information use, it is not likely that the effect sizes would be large. As mentioned, it is likely that we over-sampled younger and better educated, or at least motivated, university retirement plan members which most likely explains these results.
• Simple counts of aggregate choices indicated that subjects focussed on options diversified across asset classes, with all six pre-mixed options preferred to all four single-sector options in all but one condition. For example, the most preferred option from pairwise-comparison tasks over treatments where participants viewed asset-allocation information was the "Conservative balanced" option. In the two named treatments, the most often least preferred was "Cash", and when ranked using two best/worst designs, the most preferred was the "Socially responsible balanced", and the least, "Cash". For the treatments where asset allocation information was not shown, participants preferred the "High growth" option that also had the highest Sharpe ratio.
• Pooled models indicated that most information items prescribed in the short-form PDS are relevant to explaining choices.
The most significant marginal impact of all the prescribed information, when all information items were shown, is for asset allocation measures.
• Individuals appear to concentrate on asset allocation information at the expense of risk and return information, and this shows up in our modelling as unexpected signs on return and risk coefficients. When asset allocation information is not shown to participants, they revert to a risk-return trade-off and the estimated coefficients have the expected signs when all information variables are included in the models.
• Estimation of individual models showed that subjects use elements of the prescribed information differently. We demonstrate that over 35% of individual models had no significant marginal effects of information items and only a few had four or more significant effects.
• Participants preferred options with more asset classes (lower concentration) and with equally sized weights (lower deviation from a 1/n allocation). This novel application of a 1/n strategy to pre-mixed portfolios expands significantly the standard findings of naïve diversification in studies where portfolio asset class allocations are mixed by participants.
Why were participants' choices influenced to such a great extent by the asset allocation information? While the pie chart was the only graphical piece of information displayed, making it an obvious focus of attention, our further test of the visual impact showed that a simple tabulation had similar effects. Perhaps the quickest way for our participants to discriminate between paired options was to look at each pie chart or table and to not bother to read the accompanying text. While such cursory processing might have occurred (for some participants), it is clear that the nature of the allocation itself -specifically the number and relative sizes of the weights -influenced subsequent choices.
This adoption of a 1/n strategy in paired choices from pre-mixed options represents an extension of the more general diversification strategies often observed in the retirement savings literature Thaler, 2001, 2007; Gerrans and Yap, 2013) . In these studies, participants were faced with the choice of how to allocate a given amount across a set of options. In our studies participants were faced with menus containing predetermined allocations. The fact that 1/nconsistent behaviour dominates in both settings is testament to the seductiveness of this simple rule and evidence against the observation that the diversification heuristic does not apply to pre-mixed funds (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007, p. 90) .
Early studies of such "variety-seeking" behaviour documented participants' tendencies to prefer more diversity in consumer products when choosing simultaneously than when choosing sequentially (Read and Loewenstein, 1995; Simonson, 1990) . This behaviour can lead to consumers ending up with more variety in their purchases than they may have wanted (e.g., Read and Loewenstein, 1995) . The mechanism driving the preference for more diversified options in the current experiment is likely to be different. Here our (mostly) naïve participants could have been driven by the simple rule of thumb that "putting all your eggs in one basket" is sub-optimal when it comes to retirement savings, and thus options which appear to spread assets among many "baskets" are likely to be better. Risk-return trade-offs apparently take second place to diversification heuristics and are adopted by many participants only when the eggs and baskets are hidden (i.e., in Treatment 4).
We note that while simple rule-following might be behind the choices we see here, empirical evaluations of different portfolio-building methods show that equally-weighted (1/n) portfolios are not necessarily inferior to, and in many cases perform better than, portfolios constructed using more sophisticated or finely-tuned procedures, particularly where decisions are made under parameter uncertainty (see DeMiguel et al., 2007, among others) .
In short, the behaviour of our participants can be summarized as the operation of two cognitive heuristics -"choose diversified/balanced allocations" or -"choose the best risk-return combination", but not the optimal combination of both. The design of our experiment, with multiple repeated pairings and several methods for eliciting preferences, probably reinforced the adoption of one or other of these shortcuts, but the former evidently dominates the latter for short-form PDS layouts currently widely used.
In introducing the disclosure format evaluated here, the intention of the regulator was to reduce complexity, increase comparability and encourage engagement with financial decisions (Treasury, 2010) . While there was extensive consultation (see Treasury, 2010, pp. 18, 21-22) and even some independent consumer testing, the pre-testing of formats focussed on simplicity and comparability (Treasury, 2010, p. 18 ), but apparently not on how people would use the information provided. 16 Our results indicate, in line with existing studies (Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011) , that first-order improvements from simplification cannot be assumed, but need to be directly checked. Indeed, instructions from the plan provider such as: 'You must consider the likely investment return, the risk and your investment timeframe when choosing an investment option in which to invest.' UniSuper (2015a, p. 5)while probably necessary, are not sufficient to guarantee that information serves the purpose for which it is intended.
In addition, the highly influential asset-allocation information shown to participants here is an example of a format that can be easily manipulated. Unsupervised or unscrupulous financial service providers could re-label or reweight assetallocation information towards low concentration, even allocations, and tilt investors towards particular products. Pool et al. (2015) report that 401(k) plan participants go along with favouritism towards mutual funds from the "fund family" preferred by the plan sponsor. This favouritism is costly to members. Careful incentive-compatible pre-testing, in natural settings and with representative samples of consumers, of responses to information items and formats prescribed by regulators seems necessary if members are to continue to take responsibility for their investment choices.
